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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
NORMA HOWARD,
BRIEF OF APPELLANT
Petitioner/Appellant,
vs.
Case No.

940010CA

STATE OF UTAH,
Respondent/Appellee.
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Jurisdiction

over

appeals

from

circuit

courts

is

conferred on the Utah Court of Appeals by Section 78-203(2)(d), Utah Code.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
Standard of Review as to All Issues
All of the issues were decided within the context of the
granting of a motion for summary judgment.

This court stated

the applicable standard of review in Briggs v. Holcomb, 740
P.2d 281, 283 (1987), thusly:
On reviewing a summary judgment, an
appellate court applies the same standard
as that applied by the trial court.
Durham v. Maraetts. 571 P.2d 1332, 1334
(Utah 1977). lf[W]e consider the evidence
in the light most favorable to the losing
party, and affirm only where it appears
there is no genuine dispute as to any
material issues of fact, or where, even
l

according to the facts as contended by
the losing party, the moving party is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law."
Themy v. Seagull Enterprises, Inc.. 595
P.2d 526, 528-29 (Utah 1979).
Issues on Appeal
1.

Whether the subject automobile was "used . . .

any manner to facilitate . . . simple possession . . .

in

of a

controlled substance" and therefore was subject to forfeiture
under Section 58-37-13, Utah Code, because a driver happens
to have marijuana in his pocket while moving the automobile
out of the way of his own vehicle.
2.

Whether

the

appellant

was

an

"owner"

of

the

automobile within the meaning of Section 58-37-13(1) (e) (ii) ,
Utah Code, such that her lack of knowledge of and consent to
the

illegal

use

by

a

nominal

joint

owner

would

preclude

forfeiture under that section.
3.
violation

Whether
of

the

forfeiture
Fourth

is

Amendment

precluded
to

the

because
United

of

States

Constitution and Article I, Section 14 of the Constitution of
Utah because:
a)

There was no record of the purported warrant that

was claimed to justify the detention and search of the driver
and the initial seizure of appellant's automobile.

2

b)

The

specifying

vehicle

the

was

seized

automobile

and

without
there

prior

were

no

process
exigent

circumstances which justified a seizure without obtaining
prior process.
DETERMINATIVE LAW
Section 58-37-13, Utah Code, provides in pertinent part:
Property subject to forfeiture - Seizure
- Procedure
(1)

The following are subject to forfeiture and no

property right exists in them:
• • • •

(e)
all conveyances including
aircraft, vehicles, or vessels used or
intended for use, to transport, or in any
manner facilitate the transportation,
sale, receipt, simple possession, or
concealment of property described in
Subsection (1)(a) and (1)(b), except
that:
(ii)
a conveyance may not be
forfeited under this section by reason of
any act or omission committed or omitted
without the owner's knowledge or consent,
and
(iii) any forfeiture of a conveyance
subject to a bona fide security interest
is subject to the interest of a secured
party who could not have known in the
exercise of reasonable diligence that a
violation would or did take place in the
3

use of the conveyance.
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution,
provides:
The right of the people to be secure
in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches
and seizures, shall not be violated, and
no Warrants shall issue, but upon
probable cause, supported by Oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing
the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized.
Article I, Section 14 of the Constitution of Utah is
substantively identical to the Fourth Amendment, supra,
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
(a) Nature of the Case
This is an appeal of an order of the Third Circuit Court
granting summary judgment for the respondent/appellee State
and

denying

summary

the

judgment

petitioner/appellant's
on

a

petition

for

cross
the

motion

return

of

for
an

automobile seized for forfeiture pursuant to Section 58-3713, Utah Code.

(The Controlled Substance Act).

4

(b)

Course of the Proceedings

The appellant, pursuant to Section 58-37-13(9)(e), Utah
Code, brought a Verified Petition for Release of Property
seeking the return of the property, including the subject
automobile,

seized

in a drug

raid.

(R-l) •

The State

released some of the property but filed an Answer (R-44)
seeking the forfeiture of the automobile and at the same time
filed a motion for summary judgment and supporting memorandum
(R-50) and affidavit.
cross motion

(R-56). The appellant responded with a

for summary

judgment

memorandum (R-61) and affidavits.
(c)

(R-60) and

supporting

(R-72-81).

Disposition in Circuit Court

After oral argument, the circuit court issued an order
on December 13, 1993, granting the State's motion and denying
the

appellant's

cross

motion

for

summary

judgment.

(Appendix; R-97). The appellant filed a notice of appeal to
this court on January 10, 1994.
(d)

Statement of Facts

The underlying facts were not in dispute.
property was an automobile

The subject

("the Mustang") which had been

given to the petitioner/appellant, Norma Howard, ("the
5

wife").

(R-73,76,79).

The automobile was registered by her

husband, Leon Howard, to "Leon (or) Norma Howard."

(R-57) .

Both the wife and her husband regarded the Mustang as the
sole property

of the wife

(R-77,

80) and the wife had

requested that Legal Services obtain an award of the Mustang
in a divorce that Legal Services was to seek for her.
80) .

(R-

The husband has his own vehicle and did not drive the

Mustang without the express permission of the wife and had
done so only on rare occasion.

(R-77).

On the date of the seizure, the wife had parked the
subject automobile behind her husband's truck blocking it in
the driveway of their home.

(R-77, 80-81).

When the husband

went to leave, the wife told him to move her Mustang himself
so he could get his own truck out of the driveway because she
was busy.

Ibid.

As the husband was moving the Mustang

within the driveway, he was blocked by a police car, detained
and searched by police officers (R-77) who were acting under
the color of a purported search warrant for his person and
the residence.

(R-56-57).

A small quantity of marijuana,

which the husband had forgotten, was found in the pocket of
his pants and he was arrested.

(R-57-77).

There is nothing

in the record indicating that any contraband was located in
the Mustang.
6

The automobile was seized for forfeiture "incident to
the arrest of the husband."

(R-57).

The purported search

warrant for the residence and the person of the husband did
not specify the automobile.1

No process for the seizure of

the Mustang was ever issued, nor did any magistrate or judge
authorize

the

seizure

until

the

order

appealed

here

was

issued over three months after the seizure.
The alleged warrant, that was claimed to justify the
detention and search of the husband as well as the residence,
was

purported

Court. 2

to

have

been

issued

by

the

Third

Circuit

However, there was no record of any such warrant for

the husband

or the

residence

in the Third Circuit Court.

That is, not only was there no application and

supporting

affidavit and no return, but there was no indication that the
court had ever issued such a warrant up to and including the
time of submission of the cross motions for summary judgment
at the end of November, 1993. 3
1

A copy of the purported warrant that was left at
residence was attached to the Verified Petition (R-6).
2

the

See Note 1.

3

This negative fact is supported in the record by a
statement in the Verified Petition, dated September 28, 1993
(R-2); a representation in the Memorandum in Opposition that
the clerk of the court had reported as of November 23, 1993,
that there was nothing on file with regard to such a search
warrant. (R-68). The State offered nothing to the contrary.
7

The husband admitted to possession of marijuana and pled
guilty

to

that offense

in the Circuit

Court. 4

The wife

denied giving her husband permission to possess marijuana in
her Mustang and denied that she had any knowledge of him
doing so until after he was arrested. (R-80).

Her permission

as to the Mustang was limited to allowing her husband to move
the automobile a few feet so that he could get his own truck
out of the driveway.
her

husband

used

Ibid.

marijuana

The petitioner was aware that
but

had

not

approved

of

his

keeping it in their house and had argued about that with him.
(R-78,80).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Point I: The Vehicle Was Not Subject to
Forfeiture.
The Mustang

automobile was not subject

to

forfeiture

because it was not put to a use which in any manner facilitated the possession of marijuana.
driver, who happened

It was undisputed that the

to have marijuana

in his pocket, was

moving the Mustang just so that he could leave in his own
truck which was blocked in the driveway by the Mustang.
4

That

State v. Leon Howard, Third Circuit Court, S.L. Dept., No.
931012672 F.S., brought to the trial court's attention.
(R63-64) .
8

use did not facilitate the possession of the contraband as
the statute requires to subject the vehicle to forfeiture.
Point II: As an Innocent Owner Appellant
Was Entitled to the Return of Her
Vehicle.
The Utah statute provides that a vehicle may not be forfeited by reason of an act committed without the owner's
knowledge or consent and it was undisputed that the possession

of

marijuana

was

without

the wife's

knowledge and

consent.
A.

The circuit court erroneously applied the federal

constitutional due process test rather than the Utah statutory test and erroneously required that the wife prove that
the vehicle was moved without her consent or that she had
done all she could to prevent the offense.
B.

The undisputed facts showed that the wife was the

actual and equitable sole owner of the Mustang.

The facts

that the Mustang was registered in the alternative names of
the husband and wife and that the Motor Vehicle Code provides
that either joint owner can endorse the certificate of title
and

transfer

ownership

have

no

bearing

ownership under the forfeiture statute.

9

on

determining

C.

Even if the wife were considered a co-owner with

the guilty husband, the statute protects an innocent coowner.

The cases from other states interpreting similar

statutes overwhelmingly hold that such statutes protect the
innocent co-owner, either by precluding forfeiture altogether
or

protecting

the

innocent

owner

to

the

extent

of her

interest, and reject arguments attributing guilt or knowledge
from the guilty to the innocent co-owner.
D.

The appropriate relief under the Utah statute is to

preclude forfeiture altogether where there is an innocent coowner.

Alternatively,

if the Utah

statute protects the

innocent co-owner to the extent of her interest, the innocent
wife's interest in this case is to the entire vehicle and she
is entitled to its return.
Point III:
Forfeiture is Precluded by
Constitutional and Statutory Violations
in the Seizure.
A.

There

was

no

record

of

the

purported

search

warrant, that was the claimed justification for the initial
seizure of the person of the husband and the wife's Mustang
and the search which produced the contraband, in the court
which allegedly

issued that warrant.

Such a failure to

comply with the requirements for issuing a search warrant
10

deprives the warrant of presumed validity and renders the
searches

and

seizures

invalid

and the evidence

obtained

inadmissable in a forfeiture matter.
B.

The circuit court lacked jurisdiction, even if the

purported search warrant for the husband's person were valid,
because the vehicle was seized without process specifying the
Mustang and there were no exigent circumstances that would
excuse the failure to get such a warrant.
DETAILS OF THE ARGUMENT
I.
THE VEHICLE WAS NOT SUBJECT TO
FORFEITURE BECAUSE IT WAS NOT USED TO
FACILITATE THE POSSESSION OF MARIJUANA.
The subject vehicle, the Mustang, was not put to a use
which would bring it within the purview of the forfeiture
statute, Section 58-37-13, Utah Code.

That section provides

in pertinent part:
(1)
The following are subject to
forfeiture and no property right exists
in them:

(e)
all conveyances . . . used or
intended for use, to transport, or in any
manner facilitate the transportation,
sale, receipt, simple possession, or
concealment of [controlled substances or
paraphernalia for trafficking in con-*
11

trolled substances] . . .
The

court

below

held

that, because

the husband

of

appellant was in the car with marijuana in his pocket, the
"car was used in a manner that facilitated the possession and
is therefore subject to forfeiture."

(R-97-98, Appendix i-

ii).
Appellant contends that this is an erroneous interpretation

and

application

of

the

statutory

language

to

the

undisputed facts. While the use of the modifying phrase, "in
any manner" renders the scope of the verb "facilitate" broad
indeed, the conveyance must none-the-less be shown to have
been used in some manner to facilitate the possession of the
contraband.

Forfeiture provisions are not favored in the law

and are strictly construed.

Russell v. Park City Utah Corp.,

548 P.2d 889, 891 (Utah 1976) (Contract law context); In re
Forfeiture of One 1970 Ford, 823 P.2d 339, 341 (N.M. Ct. App.
1991); One 1978 Chevrolet Van v. County of Churchill, 634
P.2d 1208, 1209 (Nev. 1981).
It was undisputed that the only, "use" to which appellant's husband was putting the Mustang was to move it a few
feet so that it was no longer blocking his own truck in the
driveway.

There was no nexus whatsoever between this "use"

of the Mustang and the possession of the marijuana which just
12

happened to be stored unconsciously in the husband's pocket.
The only nexus between the marijuana and the Mustang was that
of proximity.

While the Utah legislature could have provided

for the forfeiture of any vehicle in which contraband was
located, it chose not to do so.
with Section

Compare the Utah Statute

932.703, Florida Statutes

(1985), quoted in

State v. Crenshaw, 548 So.2d 223, 224-225 (Fla. 1989).
The appellant is not arguing that the vehicle is not
forfeitable simply because the contraband was in the husband's pocket rather than found somewhere in the car.
defendant

had

been

using

the

Mustang

to

If the

transport

the

marijuana to another location, for example, it would not make
any difference that the marijuana was in the husband's pocket
rather than on the seat beside him.
So.2d 531 (Ala. Cir. App. 1987).

State v. Pudzis, 507

Appellant is contending

that the husband's use of the Mustang in all the circumstances

of

this

case

did

not

facilitate

his possession

of

marijuana in any way, not even serving as a holding receptacle while he drove.
The Utah statute requires that the use of the vehicle
"facilitate" the possession
"Facilitate"

means

"to

(or other prohibited conduct).

make

Webster's Collegiate Dictionary.
13

easy

or

less

difficult."

The Mustang was not being

used to make the husband's possession of marijuana "easy or
less difficult."

Certainly that possession would not have

been made more difficult if the Mustang had not been parked
where it was blocking his own vehicle and the husband had not
had to move it.

II. AS AN INNOCENT OWNER, APPELLANT WAS
ENTITLED TO THE RETURN OF HER VEHICLE.
The Utah

forfeiture

statute

provides

an

express "in-

nocent owner" defense to forfeiture of vehicles in Section
58-37-13(1)(e)(ii), Utah Code, as follows:
a conveyance may not be forfeited
under this section by reason of any act
or omission committed or omitted without
the owner's knowledge or consent.
Despite the undisputed evidence that the wife did not
have knowledge of or consent to her husband's possession of
marijuana in the Mustang, the court below concluded that she
was

not

entitled

to

the

statutory

protection.

(R-98,

Appendix ii).
A.
Federal case law does not modify the
Utah statutory innocent owner defense.
The court below, in its Order Granting Respondent's
14

Motion for Summary Judgment concluded:
Further, even if Petitioner could
assert an innocent owner's interest, she
does not argue that the car was either
moved without her consent or that she did
what she reasonably could to prevent the
illegal use of the car by the defendant.
Under federal case law only these two
circumstances would support her assertion
against forfeiture.
Ibid.

Thus the circuit court, citing federal case law, added

an additional requirement that is not required by the Utah
statute to qualify an innocent owner to protection against
forfeiture.

While appellant also contends that she did do

all that she reasonably could to prevent the illegal use,
more importantly she contends that the circuit court erred in
concluding that she had to meet either that requirement or
show that the car was moved without her consent.
The

"federal

case

law" referred

to

originates with

Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co. , 416 U.S. 663, 94
S.Ct. 2080, 40 L.Ed. 452 (1974), wherein the Supreme Court
upheld a forfeiture under Puerto Rican law against a due
process attack.
Utah

statute,

The Puerto Rican forfeiture law, unlike the
had

innocent owners.

no

provision

providing

protection

to

In dicta, the court observed that, if an

owner could show that the forfeited conveyance was taken
15

without his consent or that he had done all he could to
prevent unlawful use, it would be difficult to reject a
constitutional claim.

416 U.S. at 686, 94 S.Ct. at 2094.

The Supreme Court, by suggesting the minimal standard for
protection that is required by federal constitutional law
did not mean to preclude a state from providing more protection to innocent owners in its state forfeiture statute.
E.g., State v. One 1984 Toyota Truck, 533 A.2d 659, 665 (Md.
1987).

In re Forfeiture of $53.00, 444 N.W.2d 182, 186-187

(Mich. Ct. App. 1989).
The United States Supreme Court has recently applied the
innocent owner protection which now appears in the federal
controlled substance law to preclude the forfeiture of a home
purchased by the mistress of a drug dealer with funds that
were a gift to her and traceable to a illegal drug transaction.

United States v. A Parcel of Land,

S.Ct. 1126 (1993).

U.S.

, 113

The Court held that proof of a lack of

knowledge was all that the statute5 required and refused to
read in to the statute an additional requirement that the
5

The federal drug law forfeiture provisions were amended in
1978 to provide: lf[N]o property shall be forfeited under
this paragraph, to the extent of the interest of an owner, by
reason of any act or omission established by that owner to
have been committed or omitted without the knowledge or
consent of that owner." 21 U.S.C. §881(a)(6).
16

protected owner be a bona fide purchaser for value, 113 S.Ct.
at 1134, yet alone prove that she had done all she could to
determine the source of the funds.
Regardless

of

the

state

of

federal

law,

the

Utah

legislature has chosen to protect owners where the unlawful
act was committed "without the owner's knowledge or consent."
The wife here asserted under oath that the husband's possession of marijuana in her car was without her knowledge or
consent. Affidavit of Norma Howard

(R-80 ) .

That is all

that the Utah stature requires.
B.
As the actual and equitable sole
owner, the innocent wife was entitled to
return of the vehicle.
The court below observed that:
sole owner

"Were the Petitioner the

of the vehicle she could

assert an innocent

owner's interest with persuasiveness."

However, the trial

court went on to conclude that the wife was a joint owner
with the guilty husband.
Summary Judgment

Conclusion No. 2, Order Granting

(R-98, Appendix ii) .

The only basis for

that conclusion was the fact that the vehicle was registered
to "Leon (or) Norma Howard."
The wife asserted below that she was "the actual and
equitable sole owner of the vehicle."
17

Memorandum in Opposi—

tion, (R-65).

The undisputed facts submitted in support of

that assertion were set out in the Statement of Material
Facts in the wife's Memorandum in Opposition

(R-61-63) as

follows:
In the summer of 1991, the prior
owner of the subject Mustang car, Tricia
Tedford, was staying with petitioner.
Her boyfriend, Ricky Knox, was arrested
while driving the car and extradited to
Arkansas. The car was impounded because
the registration was expired among other
problems.
Tricia and her infant child
continued to reside with petitioner for
six months until she returned to Arkansas. Tricia conveyed the Mustang car to
Norma Howard in gratitude for her
hospitality and because the storage
charges were mounting and she could not
afford to get the car out and had to
return to Arkansas. (Affidavit of Tricia
Tedford; Affidavit of Norma Howard) [R72-79].
The Mustang was registered in late
1991 to Leon and/or Norma Howard because
Leon Howard was a licensed driver and
Norma was not.
Leon Howard obtained a
bill of sale from Tricia Tedford in a
nominal amount to use in registering the
vehicle. (Affidavit of Leon Howard) [R76] .
At the end of 1992, Norma and Leon
Howard began to experience problems with
their marriage. Norma Howard consulted
with Legal Aid in the summer of 1993 and
got on a waiting list to receive legal
services to get a divorce. She requested
at that time that she be awarded the
Mustang. Norma Howard uses the Mustang
to transport herself and her four small
18

children on errands.
Howard) [R-79]•

(Affidavit of Norma

Leon Howard agrees that the Mustang
automobile was Norma's separate property.
Leon has two trucks and an automobile
registered in his sole name. One of the
trucks is a "dressed up" blue Nissan
which he uses as his personal transportation. Leon would not drive the Mustang
away from the residence without the
express permission of Norma. (Affidavit
of Leon Howard) [R-76].
It is submitted that in view of the foregoing undisputed
facts, the court below should have concluded that the wife
was the sole "owner" within the meaning of the statute and,
since

the

unlawful

use

of

the Mustang

was without her

knowledge or consent, was entitled to its return.

At the

very least, the affidavits raised a factual dispute on the
issue.
The state in its Memorandum in Support of Motion for
Summary Judgment (R-52) asserted the applicability of Section
41-la-702(2)(a)

of

the

Utah

Motor

Vehicle

Code,

provides:
if a title certificate reflects the
names of two or more people as coowners in the alternative by the use of
the word "or" or "and/or", each co-owner
is considered to have granted the other
co-owners the absolute right to endorse
and deliver title and to dispose of the
vehicle.
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which

No doubt, if the husband had endorsed and delivered the
certificate of title, the transferee would be able to defeat
a claim by the wife.

However, this is not a dispute as to

ownership under the Motor Vehicle Code but a question of
statutory protection against forfeiture.
In State v. One 1979 Pontiac Trans Am, 771 P.2d 682
(Utah Ct. App. 1989), this court was faced with the application of the closely analogous protection against forfeiture
afforded to a holder of a bona fide security interest in the
subsection immediately following the innocent owner subsection at issue here.

This court affirmed the trial court's

ruling protecting the unperfected security interest held by
the guilty owner's grandparents against the forfeiture of a
vehicle used to transport cocaine.

The Motor Vehicle Code,

in Section 41-la-601, requires a security interest to be
perfected to be valid against creditors acquiring a lien or
subsequent purchasers.

The grandparents in One 1979 Pontiac

Trans Am. supra, were held to be protected by subsection
(1)(e)(iii) of Section 58-37-13, Utah Code, by showing they
were holders of a "bona fide security interest" despite the
fact that

that

interest was not perfected

Vehicle Code requires.

as the Motor

Similarly, the wife here should be

held protected by subsection (1)(e)(ii) of that same section
20

by showing she was the actual sole owner despite the fact
that her husband's name was also on the registration and she
might not have been able to assert a claim of ownership
against a purchaser who had a certificate of title endorsed
by the husband because of the Motor Vehicle Code.
In determining the protection afforded an innocent coowner under a similarly worded statute, the Michigan Court of
Appeals, stated:
In particular, we reject the notion
that the language of a title to a vehicle
necessarily controls the rights of the
owner under the Michigan forfeiture
statute•
In re Forfeiture of $53.00, 444 N.W.2d 182, 186 (1989).

The

Ohio Supreme Court also rejected the argument that ownership
in forfeiture matters

is conclusively established by the

certificate of title and approved the protection of equitable
ownership not of record, saying:
Initially, we must conclude that the
provisions of R.C. 4505.04 were designed
to protect title as between true and
fraudulent title claimants and to create
an instrument evidencing title to and
ownership of motor vehicles. (Citations
omitted).
We do not hold that the
legislature intended for said section to
be construed to effectively deprive
equitable owners of their interest in a
vehicle where that vehicle may be
21

forfeited to the state.
State v. Shimits. 461 N.E.2d 1278, 1281 (Ohio 1984).
The State, seeking a forfeiture under Section 58-37-13,
Utah Code, is not taking by endorsement of title by one of
the record title holders and is bound by the provision of the
forfeiture law that protects an owner without reference to
how the ownership is shown on the registration or certificate
of

title.

The

wife, having

established

by

uncontested

affidavits that she was the actual and equitable sole owner
and that any use of the automobile to facilitate possession
of marijuana

was without

her

knowledge

or

consent, es-

tablished that the Mustang could not be forfeited and that
she was entitled to its return.
C.
Assuming that the wife and husband
were co-owners, the wife is still
protected against forfeiture as an
innocent owner.
While appellant contends that she is the sole owner, she
would still be protected if she were a co-owner with her
husband
assumed.

and

for purposes of this argument that will be

The statutory protection given to innocent owners

is not limited to sole owners and, for the reasons given in
the immediate preceding discussion, is not defeated by making
22

an analogy between forfeiture and a conveyance under the
Motor Vehicle Code.
While there are no Utah appellate cases directly on
point, the majority of other state courts addressing the
issue of the statutory rights of an innocent owner where a
co-owner

is

guilty

have

either

returned

the vehicle or

ordered the innocent owner protected to the extent of her
interest•

The Arizona Court of Appeals in In the Matter of

1979 Dodge Van. 721 P.2d

683

(1986), affirmed the lower

court's order to return a van to an innocent wife whose coowner husband was caught driving the vehicle with marijuana
in it under a statute which protected a claimant who could
prove that "the claimant is the lawful owner . . . " and that
the unlawful act was without consent of the claimant.
The New Mexico Court of Appeals in In re Forfeiture of
One 1970 Ford, 823 P.2d 339 (1991), interpreting a statute
that is virtually identical to the Utah statute,6 concluded
that the protected "owner" included a joint-owner whose co6

The New Mexico statute provides: "no conveyance is subject
to forfeiture under this section by reason of any act or
omission established for (sic.) the owner to have been
committed or omitted without his knowledge or consent." 823
P. 2d at 340. The Utah statute provides: "a conveyance may
not be forfeited under this section by reason of any act or
omission committed or omitted without the owner's knowledge
or consent." Section 58-37-13(1)(e)(ii).
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owner son used their truck to transport marijuana for sale.
The court noted that forfeiture provisions are not favored at
law and are strictly construed against forfeiture.
at 341.

823 P.2d

Accord, Russell v. Park City Utah Corp. , 548 P.2d

889, 891 (Utah 1976).

The court however determined that the

state was entitled to forfeit the son's interest and remanded
with instructions to the lower court to use its equitable
powers to protect both the mother's and the state's interests.
The Supreme Court of Nevada also construed a statute,
identical to the New Mexico statute7 and virtually identical
to the Utah statute, as protecting the interest of a wife,
whose husband had used their jointly owned vehicle in a drug
transaction without her consent, specifically rejecting the
lower court's theory that "consent (to the illegal use) is
inherent in the nature of co-ownership."

One 1978 Chevrolet

Van v. County of Churchill. 634 P.2d 1208, 1209 (1981).
The Michigan Court of Appeals in In re Forfeiture of
$53.00, 444 N.W.2d 182 (1989), construed a statute, identical
to those of New Mexico and Nevada and virtually identical to
Utah's,8 as protecting an innocent mother to the extent of
^

See Note 6, supra.

8

See Note 6, supra.
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her interest in a car jointly owned with her guilty son who
used

it to transport

reversed

narcotics.

In so doing, the

court

its earlier position in People v. One 1979 Honda

Automobile. 362 N.W.2d 860 (1984), which was relied upon by
the State of Utah in its Memorandum in Support of Motion for
Summary Judgment furnished to the circuit court in this case
(R-52) to support its contention that the guilty knowledge of
one

joint

owner

was

sufficient

to

provide

a

basis

for

forfeiture of the innocent wife's interest.
The Supreme Court of Colorado held in People v. Garner,
732

P.2d

interest

1194
in

a

(1987),

that

while

vehicle

used

to

the

guilty

transport

and

co-owner's
distribute

illegal drugs was forfeitable, the interest of his ex-wife,
who

was

an

innocent

co-owner, was

entitled

to

protection

under a mitigating provision of the statute which provided
protection where the court finds that:
the possession of said property is
not unlawful and the owner of said
property was not a party to the creation
of the nuisance and would suffer undue
hardship
by
sale, confiscation
or
destruction of the property.
Section 16-13-308, 8A C.R.S. (1986), as quoted by the court,
732 P.2d at 1196.
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The Appellate Court of Illinois in People v. Wiebler,
468 N.E.2d 1007 (1984), affirmed the denial of a petition for
forfeiture where the state stipulated that a father did not
have knowledge of the criminal use of a vehicle by his son
who

was

a

co-owner.

The

court

described

the

statutory

scheme, as follows:
At the hearing on forfeiture, the
State must show by a preponderance of the
evidence that the vehicle was used in the
commission of an offense covered by the
statute.
Under section 3 6-2, the owner
of the vehicle or any person whose right,
title or interest is of record may then
show by a preponderance of the evidence
that he "did not know, and did not have
reason to know" that the vehicle was to
be used in the commission of the relevant
offense. 111.Rev.Stat.1983, ch. 38, par.
36-2.
468 N.E.2d at 1008.
and

son were

"joint

The state argued that, since the father
owners," the

son's

knowledge

illegal conduct was sufficient for forfeiture.

of

the

However, the

court held that the father was an innocent owner who could
defeat the forfeiture of the vehicle altogether.
The Maryland Supreme Court in State v. One 1984 Toyota
Truck,

533

A.2d

659

(1987),

provision that provided:

26

construed

an

innocent

owner

No conveyance shall be forfeited
under the provision of this section to
the extent of the interest of any owner
of the conveyance who neither knew nor
should have known that the conveyance was
used or was to be used in violation of
this subtitle.
533 A.2d at 663.

That court held that an innocent wife was

entitled to the return of a vehicle owned with her husband as
tenants by the entirety and used by the husband to transport
and distribute controlled substances.

While the statute only

provided protection "to the extent of the interest" of the
innocent

owner,

the

court

held

that,

because

the

wife's

interest was to the entire vehicle, the vehicle could not be
forfeited.

533 A.2d at 667.
D.
The appropriate relief for the
innocent wife in the circumstances of
this case is to order release of the
property.

As noted in the discussion of each of the cases in the
preceding section, while all of them protected the innocent
co-owner, the extent

of the relief varied.

Some courts,

having found an innocent co-owner, concluded that forfeiture
was precluded.

E.g.,

People v. Wiebler, 468 N.E.2d

1007

(111. App. 3 Dist. 1984) ; Other courts permitted forfeiture
of the guilty party's interest but protected the innocent
27

party to the extent of her interest.

E.g. , In re Forfeiture

of $53.00, 444 N.W.2d 182, 188-189 (Mich. Ct. App. 1989);
People v. Garner, 732 P.2d 1194, 1198-1199 (Colo. 1987).
The Utah statute in the subsection protecting innocent
security interests, Section 58-37-13(1)(e)(iii), provides for
forfeiture "subject to the interest of a secured party."
(Emphasis added).
innocent

owner,

However, in the subsection protecting an
Section

58-37-13(1)(e)(ii) ,

the

statute

provides:
a conveyance may not be forfeited
under this section by reason of any act
or omission committed or omitted without
the owner's knowledge or consent; . . .
(Emphasis added).
the

establishment

This language supports the contention that
of

an

innocent

owner

simply

precludes

forfeiture altogether rather than providing for forfeiture
subject to the interest of the innocent owner.
However, in the circumstances of this case either interpretation entitles the innocent wife to the return of the
Mustang because the "extent of her interest" happens to be
the entire automobile.

As argued in Section II B, pages 17-

22, supra, the undisputed facts supported by affidavit were
that the wife was the equitable sole owner of the Mustang
having the right of possession and the husband was merely a
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nominal co-owner on the registration.

There is nothing in

the record, even the fact of registration in the alternative,
that suggests the wife had only a partial interest in the
Mustang.

Therefore, even if the state were to acquire the

husband's interest by forfeiture it would acquire no property
interest as against the wife.
This matter

is more than a little complicated by the

fact that the husband was not a party to the proceedings
below and the State has not, to counsel's knowledge, sought
to

forfeit

his

interest,

such

as

it may be.

Since

the

husband has been convicted of possession of marijuana, the
double jeopardy provision of the United States Constitution
could preclude forfeiture of his interest because forfeiture
cannot

fairly

be

characterized

as remedial.

See, United

States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 433, 109 S.Ct. 1892 (1989).
husband

The

also could raise the prohibition against excessive

fines contained in the Eighth Amendment to the United States
Constitution according to the recent Supreme Court decision
of Austin v. United States,
(1993).

U.S.

, 113 S.Ct. 2801

If affirmed, the court below's interpretation of the

innocent owner protection could lead to the absurd result of
the

innocent

owner's

interest

being

guilty co-owner's interest is not.
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forfeited

while

the

III. FORFEITURE IS PRECLUDED BY CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY VIOLATIONS IN THE
SEIZURES.
A.
The initial seizure of the vehicle
was the result of search and seizure in
violation of the Fourth Amendment to the
United States Constitution and Article I,
Section 14 to the Utah Constitution.
The subject Mustang was seized for forfeiture incident
to

the

arrest

of

appellant's

possession of marijuana.

husband

presumably

for

the

Affidavit (of Detective Harper) in

Support of Motion for Summary Judgment

(R-57).

justification for the detention of the husband

The claimed
(and conse-

quently the initial seizure of the wife's Mustang that he was
driving)
person.

was

a

warrant

for

the

search

of

the

husband's

Ibid.

Because there was no record whatsoever in the court that
allegedly issued the warrant of the issuance or return of the
purported

search

warrant,

the

counsel

for

appellant

com-

plained in the Verified Petition filed on September 28, 1993,
twenty-six
determine

days

after

the

raid,

that

if the warrant was validly

asserted it was not.

(R - 2 ) .

he

was

issued and

unable

to

therefore

Almost two months later, as of

November 23, 1993, the clerk was still reporting that there
was nothing on file with regard to a search warrant for the
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residence or the person of the husband and the appellant so
informed the court below in the Memorandum in Opposition to
Respondent's Motion for Summary Judgment and in Support of
Petitioner's Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment.
that

submission,

the

appellant

wife

made

(R-68).

the

In

following

argument: (R-69-69)
The Utah Search Warrant Statute, Section 77-23-4, Utah
Code, requires a record be kept of the testimony providing
probable

cause.

Utah

Code

Annotated,

Section

77-23-7,

requires that the serving officers "shall promptly make a
verified return of the warrant to the magistrate." Apparently, neither was done.

The obvious purpose of these statutes

is to provide a method for persons affected to test the
validity

of the warrant and to determine the status of

property seized.

(The Utah Supreme Court has held a warrant

invalid where the testimony showing probable cause was not
reduced to writing.
844 (Utah 1968).

State v. Jasso, 21 Utah 2d 24, 439 P. 2d
Whether the testimony was so reduced in

this case is unknown but certainly it was not made a part of
the court

record

which

is the purpose of taking

it in

writing).
It

is

submitted

that

the gross deviation

from the

statutory procedure which occurred in this case deprived the
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appellant of her right to be secure from unreasonable and
warrantless seizures as guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment to
the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 14 of
the Constitution of Utah.

The obvious remedy is to deprive

the state of the presumed validity of a seizure and search
pursuant to a warrant where there is no court record of the
issuance of the warrant or of a return over eighty days after
the seizure.
Accordingly,
(which

resulted

the
in

seizure
the

and

original

search
seizure

of
of

the
the

husband
wife's

automobile) and the fruits of that search should be held in
violation of the wife's aforementioned constitutional rights.
Forfeiture may not be predicated on evidence seized in
violation of the Fourth Amendment (and by parallel reasoning,
Article I, Section 14 of the Constitution of Utah.)

See, One

1958 Plymouth Automobile Sedan v. Pennsylvania, 380 U.S. 693,
85 S Ct. 1246 (1965).
In the court below, the state did not belatedly file the
missing documents or offer any explanation for the lack of
any record of the claimed warrant.

The court below in the

Order Granting Respondent's Motion for Summary Judgment (R98, Appendix ii) concluded that the seizure of the vehicle
was not illegal but did not specifically address the forego—
32

ing argument.
B.
Because the vehicle was seized
without process directed to the vehicle
the court below lacked jurisdiction to
forfeit regardless of whether the
detention, search and arrest were valid.
In Davis v. State, 813 P.2d 1178 (Utah 1991), the Utah
Supreme Court held that the forfeiture statute required that
the seizure must be pursuant to a seizure warrant subject to
four exceptions, and:
Implicit in all the exceptions to
the requirement of a warrant is the
principle that the seizure must be
pursuant to some kind of process directed
to the property (i.e., not just an arrest
warrant) or required by exigent circumstances .
813 P.2d at 1181-82.

In Davis, the vehicle had been used to

drive to a location where drugs were purchased and divided up
between
vehicle.
owners
incident

suspects

and

the

undercover

officer

within

the

Later an arrest warrant was obtained, the vehicle's
arrested
to

and

the

the arrest.

vehicle

seized

for

forfeiture

Because there was no

"process

directed to the property" or exigent circumstances justifying
a warrantless

seizure, the Utah Supreme Court found the

seizure invalid which in turn deprived the district court of
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jurisdiction to order the forfeiture.

Ibid, at 1184.y

In the instant case, while there might have been a
search warrant
Howard,

there

directed
clearly

at the home and person of Leon
was

no

process

"directed

property," specifically, the Mustang automobile.

to

the

Even if the

search and arrest of Leon Howard were valid and the search of
the automobile were valid (although it yielded nothing) as
incident to the arrest, there was no justification for the
forfeiture seizure of the automobile without process.
The court below concluded at (R-99, Appendix ii):
Additionally, the exigent circumstances of a car that at the moment
could have been immediately moved, had
been being moved, could be secreted by
another party or readily transferred
because of its joint ownership provided
further basis for the seizure.
However, the undisputed

facts were that the Mustang was

blocked in the driveway of appellant's home by a police car.
(R-77).

There was no reason given by the officer explaining

why a warrant authorizing the seizure of the Mustang was not
obtained by telephone or otherwise while the police were in
9

See also State v. Larocco, 794 P.2d 460, (Utah 1990)
(Plurality opinion), wherein the court limited the exceptions
to the warrant requirements of Article I, Section 14 of the
State Constitution as they pertained to an unintended vehicle
on a public street to actual exigent circumstances.
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full control of the property and the errant husband was under
arrest.

The court gives no reason why it concluded that the

wife would be inclined to spirit the vehicle into hiding or
sell it before the officers could get process even if that
had been possible.

There must be some evidence other than

the obvious mobility of an automobile to conclude that it
will be removed from the jurisdiction.
672 P.2d 1316 (Ariz. 1983).

See, State v. Will,

The Utah Supreme Court when

applying Utah law has not followed the federal "automobile
exception" which excuses a warrant simply because an automobile is involved and is mobile.
P.2d 460 (Utah 1990),

See, State v. Larocco, 794

(Plurality opinion); Davis v. State,

813 P.2d 1178 (Utah 1991).
No legal process was sought by the law enforcement
officers prior to the forfeiture seizure which occurred on
September 2, 1993 or even after the fact.
reviewed

the

matter,

even

ex

parte,

No magistrate

until

appellant's

petition for return of property was reviewed on the crossmotions
1993.

for summary

judgment sometime after November 30,

For over three months, the appellant was deprived of

her vehicle based upon the unreviewed conclusion that it was
forfeitable made by a peace officer whose agency had an
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interest in acquiring the vehicle for its own use. 1 0

The

decision to seize property here was not only not made by a
"disinterested

magistrate,"

it

was

not

even

made

by

a

disinterested police officer.
CONCLUSION AND RELIEF SOUGHT
Since none of the underlying facts were in dispute and a
proper application of the law to those facts leads to the
legal conclusion that the wife, Norma Howard, was entitled to
the return of her car, appellant requests that this court
reverse the Order of the circuit court and remand the matter
with

instructions to

vehicle

to

Norma

issue an order returning the

Howard.

In

the

alternative,

subject

Appellant

requests this court to reverse and remand with instructions
to the Circuit Court to hold a hearing, within twenty days as
Section 58-37-13(9)(e), Utah Code, requires, to resolve any
factual matters this court determines to be unresolved.

10

The state's Answer to the Petition requested as relief
that the property be awarded to the seizing agency.
Paragraph 6 of the affirmative allegations states that the
agency "is able to use the vehicle as an undercover vehicle."
(R-45).
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RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

day of February,

1994.

5HN D. O'COSNELL
attorney for
Petitioner/Appellant
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on this

£k

day of February,

1994, I mailed two (2) true and correct copies of the BRIEF
OF APPELLANT to RENA BARBIERO, Deputy County Attorney, 2001
South State Street, #S3400, Salt Lake City* Utah-^84130-1200.
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APPENDIX

CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH
SALT LAKE COUNTY, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT

NORMA HOWARD,

ORDER GRANTING RESPONDENT'S
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Petitioner,
Case No. 930011027

vs.
SIATE OF UTAH,
Respondent.

FACTS
No material issues of fact are in dispute.

Respondent

seized a jointly owned vehicle pursuant to the arrest of the
driver who was in possession of marijuana.

Petitioner is the

other joint owner of the vehicle.
CONCLUSIONS
1.

Utah Code Annotated 58 -37-13 (1) (e) requires the seized

vehicle to be "used or intended for use, to transport and or in
any manner facilitate sale, receipt, simple possession, or
concealment" of a controlled substance.

From the plain wording

of the statutory language the legislative intent is to forfeit
vehicles used in any manner in connection with controlled
substances.
In this case the Mustang was being backed out of the
defendant's driveway while Mr. Howard, the defendant, concealed

the marijuana.

Such action appears to have been intended by the

legislature to be subject to forfeiture.

As Petitioner correctly

points out, the statute does not provide for forfeiture of the
vehicle merely because marijuana was in proximity to it. But
this car was not parked next to marijuana.

The Defendant

possessing marijuana was not standing next to the car. The issue
is not proximity.
in any manner.

Rather it is as the legislature addressed, use
Defendant was inside the car with the marijuana,

backing the car out of his driveway.

Consequently the car was

used in a manner that facilitated the possession and is therefore
subject to forfeiture.
2.

Petitioner owns the vehicle jointly with the criminal

defendant.

She knew the Defendant used drugs but didn't consent

to his use of the vehicle in violation of the drug laws.

Were

Petitioner the sole owner of the vehicle she could assert an
innocent owner's interest with persuasiveness.

Here, however,

the nature of the ownership is joint and the guilty knowledge of
the defendant is a sufficient basis for forfeiture. Further,
even if Petitioner could assert an innocent owner's interest, she
does not argue that the car was either moved without her consent
or that she did what she reasonably could to prevent the illegal
use of the < ar by the defendant.

Under federal cise law only

these two circumstances would support her assertion against
forfeiture.
3.

Finally, the seizure of the vehicle in this case was

not illegal.

Respondent's answer asserts that the vehicle was

seized incident to an arrest and pursuant to 58-37-13 Utah Code

*)

^l#?

Annpnrliy

i i

Annotated.

Under Davis v State 813 p2d 1178, (1991), warrantless

seizure of property is subject to forfeiture, among other
exceptions, where the seizure is incident to arrest.
Additionally, the exigent circumstances of a car that at the
moment could have been immediately moved, had been being moved,
could be secreted by another party or readily trcxnsferred because
of its joint ownership provided further basis for the seizure.
ORDER
Accordingly, Petitioner's motion for summary judgment is
denied and Respondent's motion for summary judgment granted.
Dated this

^

day of December, 1993.

^""Circuit Court Judge
Sheila K. McCleve

1/0

/y&

Annpnchx

m

